Watchman Willie Martin Archive

EXECUTIVE ORDER DEFINED: Under the Constitution, the president is vested with the executive power of the government (Article II, Section 1, clause 1), the power to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" (Article II, Section 1, clause 7), and the power to see that the laws are faithfully executed (Article II, Section 3). From these powers is implied the authority to issue "executive orders."

Actually, the term "executive order" has never been defined by Congress. And the validity of executive orders has been questioned many times over the years, at least dating back to Lincoln' executive measures, bypassing Congress, taken during the Civil War, as mentioned above. However, a ruling as to the extent or limit to which they may be used has never been determined by the courts or by Congress.

The Federal Register contains the text of directives issued by the president. There is no congressional authorization required, nor is there any review by the judiciary.

All EOs are "laws" made by a single man ‑‑ the president of the United States. Executive Orders were signed by President Ronald Reagan supposedly authorizing arms sales to Iran, which ultimately led to the Iran‑"contra" affair and the near destruction of the Reagan presidency.

It is a frightening thought, and totally unknown to most Americans, but there are Executive Orders on the books that make it possible for the President of the United States to ignore the Constitution and its cherished Bill of Rights, Congress, the Judiciary and the very will of the American people.

It is a fact that a complete dictatorship can be imposed upon the people at any time, simply by the president declaring a national emergency.

Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 6111, 6260, 6560

Subsequently in 1933‑34, acting under 5(b), President Roosevelt issued a series of orders which prohibited the hoarding of gold and directed that all gold bullion certificates be deposited with the Federal Reserve Banks and which regulated transactions in foreign exchange :

(1) Executive order 6073 of March 10, 1933, prohibited the export or removal of gold from the United States, except as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, and banks were prohibited from making transfers of foreign exchange except in connection with certain described transactions. This order did not specifically refer to a national emergency.

(2) Executive Order 6102 of April 5, 1933, generally required holders of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates to surrender their holdings to Federal Reserve Banks. This Order stated "By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 5(b)...as amended by Section 2 of the Act of March 9, 1933,...in which amendatory Act Congress declared that a serious emergency exists, I...do declare that said emergency still continues to exist."

(3) Executive Order 6111 of April 20, 1933, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate transactions in foreign exchange and the export or withdrawal of currency from the United States. The emergency basis for E.O. 6111 was stated in the same language as the language of E.O. 6102, quoted immediately above.

(4) Executive Order 6260 of August 28, 1933, was issued to supplant Executive Orders 6102 and 6111. This order prohibited the holding or export of gold, except under license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, and authorized the Secretary to regulate or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange. In E.O. 6260 the President stated "I... do declare that a period of national emergency exists." Executive Order 6260 was confirmed and amended by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. 31 CFR Part 54, Sec 42 Op.A.G.No.35,p.9.

(5) Executive Order 6560 of January 15, 1934, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit from American to foreign banks and export of currency or silver coin. This order is still on the books today. See 31 CFR Parts 127‑128. In this Order, the President declared that "a period of national emergency continues to exist."

In January 1934 Congress ratified all acts which had been performed under the Emergency Banking Act. 48 Stat. 343 (1934); 12 U.S.C. 213 (1970)

During the 1950s and 1960s, it was believed that the best way to bring about one‑world government was by disarming the United States.

Those who feared for America's Constitutionally guaranteed liberties, and rightfully so, feared that America would be disarmed and would become easy prey for the ever‑expanding military power of the Soviet Union and Red China. They feared and opposed the powers of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, established and to disarm America. And they are not through yet.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was formed under an executive order by Teddy Roosevelt on July 26, 1908. The first time it was used to make a law was in 1916 by President Woodrow Wilson. It was said to be an 'emergency' measure and Congress was encouraged to validate it. They did.

JUNE 14th 1963 ‑‑ EXECUTIVE ORDER 11.110: This Executive Order, apparently, signed the death warrant on President John Kennedy, just as a similar one did for President Abraham Lincoln 100 years previously. ^[1]

On June 30, 1963, Kennedy signed Executive Order No. 11110, and further amended E.O. No. 10289 of September 19, 1951, thereby giving the President authority to issue the currency. He thereupon ordered the issue of $4,292,893,815.00.

This little known Executive Order called for the issuance of $4,292,893,815 in a new currency, called "United States Notes." These notes were to be issued through the Treasury, rather than through the traditional method of the Federal Reserve System. That same day, Kennedy also signed a bill changing the backing of one and two dollar bills from silver to gold adding strength to the weakening U.S. currency.

It took only between June 4th, 1963, and November 22nd to organize the conspiracy to do away with this independent thinking American. It would appear that the interest free currency was the "Straw that Broke the Camel's (International Bankers') back!" So they arranged for his prompt execution, before the nation came to realize that the Federal Reserve System was nothing but a group of International Thieves sitting on the backs of the American People. Following is a reproduction of Executive Order 11.110.

Amendment of executive order no. 10289 as amended, relating to the performance of certain functions affecting the dept. of the treasury.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, it is ordered as follows: Section 1. Executive Order No. 10289 of September 19, 1951 as amended, is hereby further amended ‑‑

(a) By adding at the end of paragraph 1 thereof of the following subparagraphs (j): the authority vested in the President by paragraph (b) of section 43 of the Act of May 12, 1933, as amended (31 U.S.C. 821 (b) to issue silver certificates against any silver bullion, silver, or standard silver dollars in the Treasury not then held for redemption of any outstanding silver certificates, to prescribe the denomination of such silver certificates, and to coin standard silver dollars and subsidiary silver currency for their redemption by

(b) By revoking subparagraphs (b) and � of paragraph 2 thereof.

The opening words of Executive Order 11921 are blunt: "WHEREAS our national security is dependent upon our ability to assure continuity of government, at every level, in any national emergency type situation that might conceivably confront the nation; and WHEREAS effective national preparedness planning to meet such an emergency, including a massive nuclear attack..."

Look closely at the words they are using, "any national emergency...including massive nuclear..." is clear. They can decide what the emergency is and it does NOT have to be nuclear attack.

Senator Mathias testified before a House Judiciary committee in 1975: "Under the authority delegated by these statutes, the President may seize property; organize and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign military forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; and in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all American citizens."

This is only the frosting...Wait until we look at the real powers they will have when they decide which day will be 'X‑Day'.

How can this be? From this 1975 testimony, Congress is aware of what can be done yet they do nothing to control this power. Are they all part of this 'mutual admiration society' in the cesspool known as Washington DC? Most will probably tell you "I don't know this, so it must be false." Where did we go wrong? How did they assume this power in absolute violation of the Constitution and all the oaths they have taken before they took office?

Part 9: Department of Commerce Section 901. Resume of Responsibilities. The Secretary of Commerce shall prepare national emergency plans and develop preparedness programs covering:

1). The production and distribution of all materials, the use of all production facilities (except those owned by, controlled by, or under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission), the control of all construction materials, and the furnishing of basic industrial services except those otherwise assigned, including:

Production and distribution of and use of facilities for petroleum, solid fuels, gas, electric power and water; Production, processing, distribution, and storage of food resources and the use of food resource facilities for such production, processing, distribution and storage; Domestic distribution of farm equipment and fertilizer; Use of communications services and facilities, housing and lodging facilities, and health, education, and welfare facilities; Production, and related distribution, of minerals as defined in Subsection 702(5), and source materials as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; and the construction and use of facilities designated as within the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior; Distribution of items in the supply systems of, or controlled by, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission; Construction, use, and management of civil aviation facilities; and Construction, use and management of highways, streets, and appurtenant structures; and Domestic distribution of health resources.

Under part 17: Of the same executive order, they will take over the complete supervision of all banks and banking operations...To the point that they will decide if you can take any money out of your account. They will demand to know what you will spend it for and decide how much you can have. However, if they do not have enough funds to give the full amount, they can ration the funds. If they figure you want your money to hoard it, they can simply refuse to give it to you. Cute?

This includes all banking facilities, so don't feel safe just because your money is in a credit union. They have everything covered! Each check they honor for over $1000 will have to have both sides photographed and of course, none of these regulations will apply to any transactions between banks. Just who does this money belong to?

For those who dabble in the stock market, under part 25 they will assume the power to close the market, suspend any redemption rights, freeze prices of stocks and bonds. Then they will allow it to reopen only when they decide conditions permit and under their complete control. Remember when Roosevelt changed the value of an ounce of gold from $20 to $35? Who benefitted then? Not us.

And for you readers who own property and believe that property belongs to you, we have a little surprise. Not if this executive order becomes effective. You will own nothing then. Here's what Part 22 of the Executive Order has to say about that:

9). National industrial reserve and machine tool program. Develop plans for the custody of the Industrial plants and production equipment in the national industrial reserve and assist the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Department of Commerce, in the development of plans and procedures for the disposition, emergency reactivation, and utilization of the plants and equipment of this reserve in the custody of the Administrator.

10). Excess and surplus real and personal property. Develop plans and emergency operating procedures for the utilization of excess and surplus real and personal property by Federal Government agencies with emergency assignments or by State and local governmental units as directed, including review of the property holdings of Federal agencies which do not possess emergency functions to determine the availability of property for emergency use, and including the disposal of real and personal property and the rehabilitation of personal property.

What do they mean by excess property? Will they tell you what of your property is excess? Are these decisions meant to punish people who had the foresight to put away coins or food for bad times? If you have been wise enough to sock these items away, please don't tell anyone.

And what is 'rehabilitation of personal property?' If someone doesn't like the way you use your property, will they take it from you and give it to someone else? Rehabilitation is 'restoring to good operation or good management'.

Are these powers we granted to the central government under the Constitution? Where do they get the idea that they can issue Executive Orders and decide a certain day that the Constitution is dead?

Did you notice that the Department of Commerce will take over all housing and lodging facilities, does that mean your home also? Maybe it also needs rehabilitation?

They will assume control of all health, education and welfare facilities. You'd better believe it will include all schools, public and private, elementary and secondary. There will be no arguments about school prayer or momentary silence anymore. The decision will be made for us.

The implications are staggering. This is a blueprint for a dictatorship and slavery. No, I haven't been smoking loco weed...this is for real.

Plans are all set "to assist civilian educational institutions, both public and private, to adjust to demands laid on them by a large expansion of government activities during any type of emergency. This includes advice and assistance to schools, colleges, universities, and other educational institutions whose facilities may be temporarily needed for Federal, State, or local programs in an emergency."

Wonder what they mean by "adjust to demands laid upon them by a large expansion of government activities?" Again notice the special words: "during any type of emergency." They didn't even mention major nuclear attack. Since "large expansion of government activities" is not defined, do they have any limitation? All this is in store for American citizens. They have established what they call the 'Federal Preparedness Agency' under the General Services Administration which has the responsibility to see that this program is carried out. We should keep our eye on the GSA.

President Richard Nixon on February 14, 1972 established the second (And illegal) system of power simply by issuing an Executive Order (E.O. #11647). Just by entering the Executive Order in the Federal Register, and no Congressmen challenging it for its illegal nature within thirty days, it becomes law.

President Carter signed Executive Order 12148, titled Federal Emergency Management, making it possible for the FEMA facility in Culpepper, Virginia to assume the duties and power of the president himself.

Executive Order 12148 entitled "Federal Emergency Management,"

Sec. 1, "Transfer of Reassignment of Existing Functions," states: "All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Defense of Civil Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense, are now transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency {FEMA}."

Thus, FEMA is, in reality, the administrative skeleton of a second government. It is a secret government operating within government. Its authority is unlimited, subject neither to congressional consent nor judicial review.

This Executive Order formed an Executive Agency with responsibility for the government's management in times of a national crises. Alarmed at the plan, Attorney General Smith dispatched a letter to William McFarlane, North's NSC boss at the time.

The Aug. 2, 1984, letter expressed fear that FEMA was establishing itself as an "emergency czar." "I believe that the role assigned to FEMA in the revised Executive Order exceeds its proper function as a coordinating agency for emergency preparedness," Smith wrote. "This department and others have repeatedly raised serious policy and legal objections to the creation of an 'Emergency Czar' role for FEMA."

1988: Executive Order 12628; United Nations Industrial Development Organization March 8, 1988. This completed the work began in 1981 and known as the Treaty No. 97‑19. With the signature of then President Ronald Reagan it became "in force" and was recognized as in effect on an international basis with the United Nations.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288), and in order to facilitate United States participation in the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization, whose constitution was ratified by the United States on August 2, 1983, and entered into force on June 21, 1985, is hereby designated as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by International Organizations Immunities Act.

This designation is not intended to abridge in any respect the privileges, exemptions, or immunities that such organization has acquired or may acquire by international agreements of by Act of Congress. {Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 10:27 a.m., March 9, 1988}

The following Executive Orders, when executed, will effectively turn the United States of America into a dictatorship.

EO 10995: Provides for control of all communication media.

EO 10997: Provides for the control of all power fuels and minerals, and all other energy sources.

EO 10998: Provides for control of all food and farms.

EO 10999: Provides for control of all transportation, highways, seaports, airports, etc.

EO 11000: Provides for the mobilization of All Civilians into work brigades under Government supervision. In other words: Slave Labor!

EO 11001: Provides for control of all Health, Education and Welfare.

EO 11002: Designates the Postmaster To Operate A National Registration of all persons living in America.

EO 11003: Provides for control of all airports and aircraft.

EO 11004: Provides for the relocation of any populations government officials believe need to be moved, from one part of the country to another. In other words the authority to relocate entire communities, or cities which have been declared designated areas to be abandoned, and establish new locations for various portions of the population. Just as happened in the Soviet Union and China.

This is why your Federal Census for the past several times has had you list all the rooms you have in your house. So government officials will know how many city, aliens or other persons they so desire to be moved in with you! The plans have already been drawn up and are part of the FEMA agenda.

EO 11005: Provides for control of railroads, waterways and public storage facilities.

All of these Executive Orders listed immediately above were combined under one Executive Order No. 11490. President Bush signed Executive Order 12803 Privatization of the Nation's infrastructure through sale of Public Assets to foreign principals which was established by Presidential Executive Order No. 12803 (1992).

Which, in effect, turned over this country's total assets, our infrastructure, land, forests, and every single piece of land in the United States, Territories, and Possession to the World Bank!

Executive Order 12938: Authorizes a national state of emergency in the event of a nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorist attack (i.e., if there should be an attack like the gas attack which occurred recently on the Japanese subway train, Bill Clinton has the authority to place the entire country under martial law) President Clinton brought every thing not covered above under total government control with: Executive Order 12919 of June 3, 1994; Titled: National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness 59 F.R. 29525

Part 1 -- Purpose, Policy and Implementation

Sec. 101. Purpose. This order delegates authorities and addresses national defense industrial resource policies and programs under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended {"the Act"}, except for the amendments to Title III of the Act in the Energy Security Act of 1980 and telecommunication authorities under Executive Order No. 12472. (b) The Director. Federal Emergency Management Agency� {"Director FEMA"} shall:

(1) Serve as an advisor to the National Security Council on issues of national security resource preparedness and on the use of the authorities and functions delegated by this order;

Sec. 201. Delegations of Priorities and Allocations.

(a) The authority of the President conferred by section 101 of the Act to require acceptance and priority performance of contracts or orders to promote the national defense over performance of any other contracts or orders, and to allocate materials, services, and facilities as deemed necessary or appropriate to promote national defense, is delegated to the following agency heads:

(1) The Secretary of Agriculture with respect to food resources ^[2], food resource facilities ^[3], and the domestic distribution of farm equipment ^[4] and commercial fertilizer ^[5];

(2) The Secretary of Energy ^[6] with respect to all forms of energy;

(3) The Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to health resources ^[7];

(4) The Secretary of Transportation with respect to all forms of civil transportation ^[8];

(5) The Secretary of Defense with respect to water resources ^[9]; and

(6) The Secretary of Commerce for all other materials, services, and facilities, including construction materials.^[10]

(b) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of those departments and agencies specified in subsection 201(a) of this order, shall administer the Defense Priorities and Allocations System {"DIAS"} regulations that will be used to implement the authority of the President conferred by section 101 of the Act as delegated to the Secretary of Commerce in subsection 201(a)(6) of this order. The Secretary of Commerce will redelagate to the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other departments and agencies as appropriate, authority for the priority rating of contracts and orders for all materials, services, and facilities needed in support of programs approved under section 202 of this order. The Secretary of Commerce shall act as appropriate upon Special Priorities Assistance requests in a time frame consistent with the urgency of the need at hand.

(c) The Director. FEMA, shall attempt to resolve issues or disagreements on priorities or allocations between Federal departments or agencies in a time frame consistent with the urgency of the issue at hand and, if not resolved, such issues will be referred to the assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for final determination.

(d) The head of each Federal department or agency ^[11] assigned functions under subsection 201(a) of this order, when necessary, shall make the finding required under subsection 101(b) of the Act. This finding shall be submitted for the President's approval through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Upon such approval the head of the Federal department or agency that made the finding may use the authority of subsection 101(a) of the Act to control the general distribution of any material (including applicable services) in the civilian market.

(e) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is hereby delegated the authority under subsection 101(c)(3) of the Act, and will be assisted by the Director of FEMA, in ensuring the coordinated administration of the Act....

All of these Executive Orders, whenever a President decides to enact them, will become the dictator of the United States of America and there is nothing Congress or the people can do stop it. They are already in place, and the courts will uphold them, of that there is no longer any doubt.

Executive Order 12949 ^[12] of February 9, 1995 Titled: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("Act") (50 U.S.C. 180), et seq.), as amended by Public Law 103-359, and in order to provide for the authorization of physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes as set forth in the Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Pursuant to section 302(a)(1) of the Act, the Attorney General is authorized to approve physical searches, without a court order (Without a Warrant!), to acquire foreign intelligence information ^[13] for periods of up to one year, if the Attorney General makes the certifications required by that section.

Sec. 2. Pursuant to section 302(b) of the Act, the Attorney General is authorized to approve applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under section 303 of the Act to obtain orders for physical searches for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information.

Sec. 3. Pursuant to section 303(a)(7) of the Act, the following officials, each of whom is employed in the area of national security or defense, is designated to make the certifications required by section 303(a)(7) of the Act in support of applications to conduct physical searches:

(a) Secretary of State;

(b) Secretary of Defense;

� Director of Central Intelligence;

(d) Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(e) Deputy Secretary of State;

(f) Deputy Secretary of Defense; and

(g) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

EO 13010: Critical Infrastructure Protection Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible property (``physical threats''), and threats of electronic, radio‑frequency, or computer‑based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures (``cyber threats''). Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation.

International Union For Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources: January 19, 1996 - Executive Order: #12986

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including sections 1 and 14 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288 et seq., as amended by section 426 of the Foreign Relations Auth-orization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Public Law 103‑236), I hereby extend to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources the privileges and immunities that provide or pertain to immunity from suit. To this effect, the following sections of the International Organizations Immunities Act shall not apply to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources:

Section 2(b), 22 U.S.C. 288a(b), that provides international organizations and their property and assets with the same immunity from suit and judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.

Section 2(c), 22 U.S.C. 288a(c), that provides that the property and assets of inter-national organizations shall be immune from search and confiscation and that their archives shall be inviolable.

Section 7(b), 22 U.S.C. 288d(b), that provides the representatives of foreign governments in or to international organizations and the officers and employees of such organizations with immunity from suit and legal process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions.

This designation is not intended to abridge in any respect privileges, exemptions, or immunities that the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources may have acquired or may acquire by international agreements or by congressional action. WILLIAM J. CLINTON

Establishment of The Domestic Policy Council: August 17, 1993: Executive order #12859.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 105, 107, and 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Sec. 1. Establishment. There is established the Domestic Policy Council ("the Council").

Sec. 2. Membership. The Council shall comprise the:

(a) President, who shall serve as a Chair-man of the Council;

(b) Vice President;

(c)� Secretary of Health and Human Services;

(d) Attorney General;

(e) Secretary of Labor;

(f) Secretary of Veterans Affairs;

(g) Secretary of the Interior;

(h) Secretary of Education;

(I) Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;

(j) Secretary of Agriculture;

(k) Secretary of Transportation;

(l) Secretary of Commerce;

(m) Secretary of Energy;

(n) Secretary of the Treasury;

(o) Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;

(p) Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers;

(q) Director of the Office of Management and Budget;

(r) Assistant to the President for Economic Policy;

(s) Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy;

(t) Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of ����������� National Service;

(u) Senior Advisor to the President for Policy Development;

(v) Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy;

(w) AIDS Policy Coordinator; and

(x) Such other officials of Executive departments and agencies as the President may, from time to time, ����� designate.

"Command" versus "Operational Control": A Critical Review of PDD‑25: The principal functions of the Several people have asked me where they could obtain a copy of the executive summary of PDD‑25. I have scoured the Web looking for a copy, but my search was unsuccessful.

I got the copy I used to write this paper from International Legal Materials (ILM), which can be found in most any law school library. ILM is also available on WESTLAW. I also recently found out that copies of the executive summary can be obtained from the U.S. Department of State by dialing 202‑647‑6575 or faxing 202‑736‑ 7720 (Fax On Demand). Ask for Document #309 when requesting by fax.

A discussion of PDD‑25 by several high‑ranking Clinton Administration officials, as well as a VERY condensed version of the executive summary (NOT the one I relied upon in writing this paper), can be found in the May 16, 1994 issue of DISPATCH, the Department of State's public affairs magazine.

On May 3, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD‑25), a policy directive outlining the administration's position on reforming multilateral peace operations.^[14] The result of a 14‑month inter‑agency review of U.S. policy regarding multinational peacekeeping operations,

PDD‑25 sets forth several stringent requirements that must be satisfied before the U.S. will participate in future international peacekeeping operations and suggests ways in which the U.N. could improve its management of such operations. ^[15]

In one of PDD‑25's provisions, the Clinton Administration attempts to clarify the position of the United States with regarding command and control of United States military personnel participating in a multilateral peacekeeping operations. ^[16] The Directive defines "command" of United States armed forces and "operational control" of those forces, distinguishes the two, and maintains that although the President never relinquishes �command� over United States military personnel, he may place United States military personnel under the "operational control" of a non‑U.S. commander for limited and defined purposes. ^[17]

Although much of the debate regarding the President's authority to commit U.S. troops to participate in United Nations peacekeeping, enforcement actions, and "peace enforcement" actions has centered primarily around Congressional war powers, ^[18]

PDD‑25 raises a significant question of the relevance and constraining effect of another of the Constitution's provisions regarding war powers: the Commander‑in‑Chief clause.^[19]

Despite the fact that the Commander‑ in‑Chief clause has traditionally been viewed and invoked as the source of broad and expansive powers by the President, the rise in the number of peace operations under the auspices of the United Nations and the increasing control that the U.N. has exerted over these operations have spawned serious questions about whether and how much the Commander‑ in‑Chief clause constrains the President's ability to lend United States armed forces to United Nations military operations. ^[20]

PDD‑25 attempts to answer this question by distinguishing between "command" and "operational control" of United States armed forces; however, a substantial question that PDD‑25 virtually invites to be asked is whether that distinction is relevant for constitutional purposes.

In other words, is "operational control" divorceable from "command" over U.S. forces, and accordingly, it constitutional for the President to place United States military personnel under the "operational control" of the United Nations or a foreign commander?

Careful examination of PDD‑25's provisions, the history of the Commander‑in‑Chief clause, and of historical examples of command over U.S. military forces by foreign powers lead to two conclusions.

First, it would not only be inconsistent with PDD‑25 for the United States to enter into or abide by an Article 43 agreement with the United Nations putting a set number of U.S. troops on call for use by the U.N. Security Council, but would be unconstitutional as well. ^[21]Second, participation by U.S. forces in U.N. operations where the U.S. does not retain full command and operational control over U.S. forces is at the very least constitutionally problematic. ^[22]

The Rise and Decline of �Assertive Multilateralism�: With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prospect of a greater role for the U.N. in world affairs began to emerge.

President Bill Clinton in his campaign and during his early days in office indicated that he would seek an increased role for the U.N. in maintaining international peace.^[23]

In a speech entitled �A New Covenant for American Security,� delivered at Georgetown University in 1991, then Governor Bill Clinton advocated �shift[ing] the burden of maintaining peace to a wider coalition of nations of which America will be a part� and exploring the possibility of establishing a U.N. Rapid Deployment Force �that could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression; preventing attacks on civilians; providing humanitarian relief; and combating terrorism and drug trafficking.� ^[24]

Upon taking office, President Clinton acted quickly to make good on his promise provide a greater role for the U.N., ^[25] a policy which his administration dubbed �assertive multi-lateralism.� ^[26]

In an apparent response to Secretary General Boutros Boutros‑Ghali proposal that member states enter Article 43 agreements with the U.N. and �earmark� forces for participation in U.N. peace operations, ^[27] The Clinton Administration made it known that it was going to explore the possibility of implementing Article 43. ^[28]

Additionally, in actions he considered as setting precedents for the future, President Clinton authorized several thousand U.S. logicians to serve in Somalia under the auspices of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), ^[29] and he also authorized U.S. troops to serve as peacekeepers under the control of the U.N. in Macedonia.^[30] President Clinton in Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD‑13) also directed his administration to commence an interagency policy study on the U.S.'s role in peacekeeping, the result of which was PDD‑25.

However, October 1993 marked the beginning of the end for this hope for an expanded role for U.N. command structures in peace operations.

On October 3, 1993, a team of U.S. Army Rangers sent to capture Mohammed Farah Aideed was ambushed in Mogadishu, resulting in eighteen American deaths and the sight of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on the evening news.^[31]

After that incident, the Clinton Administration's policy regarding the involvement of the U.S. in peace operations began a pronounced change. In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly only days after the ambush, President Clinton declared that the �United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.� ^[32]

Shortly thereafter, President Clinton announced that U.S. troops would participate in U.N. peace operations only if they served under a U.S. chain of command. A few months later in May 1994, the Clinton Administration promulgated PDD‑25 and its strict guidelines for U.S. participation in U.N. peace operations, among which included Section V regarding command and control of U.S. forces.

PDD‑25 and The Distinction Between �Command� and �Operational Control�: Section V of PDD‑25 sets forth U.S. policy with regard to command and control of U.S. forces participating in U.N. operations. ^[33]

Section V begins by emphatically declaring that the President �retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces.�

However, PDD‑25 states that the President, on a case‑by‑ case basis, may authorize the placement of U.S. troops under the operational control of a �competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council.� ^[34]

The directive then states that if a U.N. operation is likely to involve a large role for U.S. forces or the prospect of combat involving U.S. forces, then the President would be less likely to authorize U.N. operational control over U.S. forces and instead would insist on conducting any such operation under U.S. command and operational control, through regional organizations like NATO, or through ad hoc coalitions such as the coalition formed to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991.

In an effort to bolster this policy, PDD‑25 attempts to define the terms "command" and �operational control.� The directive defines �command� as �the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration.� It emphasizes that U.S. commanders derive their authority from the Constitution, federal law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Moreover, this authority �flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.�

The directive goes on to define the term �operational control.� Describing it as a �subset of command,� the directive states that �operational control� is �the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers.�

However, �operational control� does not include the authority to alter the composition of units, discipline personnel, confer promotions, redistribute supplies, separate units, or to �change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President.�

The directive makes the bold assertion that �[n]o President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces,� but it concedes that "[i]t [may] sometimes [be] prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives.� It bolsters this assertion by stating that U.S. military personnel have served under the �operational control� of foreign commanders during both world wars, Operation Desert Storm, and under NATO since the establishment of the alliance, and that U.S. military personnel have served in various U.N. peace operations since 1948.

PDD‑25 emphasizes that even when U.S. military personnel are under the operational control of a foreign commander, the �fundamental elements� of U.S. command and control continue to apply. In particular, the U.S. commander of a unit placed under the operational control of a U.N. commander retains the right to report separately to his superiors in the U.S. chain of command as well as the U.N. commander in charge of the operation. Moreover, if a U.S. commander receives an order from a U.N. commander which he feels is illegal under international law or without the mission mandate, and if he is unable to resolve the dispute with the immediate U.N. commander, he may refer the order to �higher U.S. authorities.� The directive insists that �[u]nity of command remains a vital concern,� and that many issues regarding the legality of orders and the extent of the mission mandate will be constantly reviewed ��on the ground' before orders are issued.�

Although the distinction PDD‑25 attempts to draw between �command� and �operational control� may not be especially sharp, it represents a sharp departure from the original position the Clinton Administration took with regard to establishment and use of U.N. military power.

The directive endeavors to carve out a distinction that will not only satisfy demands from within the country that the President retain ultimate control over U.S. military personnel, but one which will also satisfy increasingly apparent constitutional restrictions while at the same time not precluding the U.S. from participating in peace operations under the auspices of the U.N.

Still, an examination of the meaning of the �new found� constraint imposed by the Commander‑in‑Chief clause as well as the proffered historical precedents of �operational control� of U.S. military personnel by foreign commanders is in order to determine if the distinction passes constitutional muster.

The Commander-In-Chief Clause and Its Conception of Command and Control: The phrase �Commander‑in‑Chief� was not a new term to the Framers of the Constitution; the phrase had existed in British law since 1639 when Charles I appointed a �Commander‑ in‑Chief� over the army fighting in the First Bishop's War. ^[35]

These Commanders in Chief, as appointees of the British crown, could act legally only at the direction of the King himself, his Secretary of War, or Parliament.

The Continental Congress also employed the term and its understood meaning when it appointed George Washington �General and Commander‑in‑Chief of the Army of the United Colonies� in 1775.

However, Congress required Washington, under the terms of his commission, to obey its orders and directions.^[36]

Additionally, Congress, still fearful of standing armies, required Washington to report regularly to Congress and to acknowledge Congress's ultimate authority in the selection of his top officers.45 But as the Revolutionary War dragged on, Congress eventually realized that conducting war by committee was not practical; it eventually formed the Board of War, which conveyed orders from Congress to General Washington.

The Framers of the Constitution employed the term �Commander‑in‑Chief� in the Article II, Section 2, clause 1 in outlining the powers of the President of the United States:

The President shall be Commander‑in‑Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States...

The clause received scant discussion at the Constitu-tional Convention, 48 and Alexander Hamilton stated tersely in The Federalist No. 69 that the clause established the President at �the first admiral and general of the Confederacy� and vested in him �supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces.�

The clause did not receive much more discussion during the state ratifying conventions.50 What discussions did take place at the state ratifying conventions concerning the Commander‑in‑Chief clause centered primarily around concerns that the President might use the armed forces to impose dictatorial rule.51 Other concerns expressed the fears of some that the clause might enable the President to exercise direct control over the armed forces. Supporters of the Constitution countered that the clause vested in the President only traditional Commander‑in‑Chief powers, powers which could be exercised only over forces constituted by Congress pursuant to its constitutional powers.

In addition to establishing clear civilian control over U.S. military forces, the Commander‑in‑Chief clause vests ultimate control over the nation's armed forces in the President.54 Having learned the difficulties of conducting �war by committee� by subordinating the military to the control of the Continental Congress, the Framers vested control over the military in the President in order to ensure consistency in the command of the armed forces. While Congress received the power to make the political decision of whether to commit the nation to war, the President received the authority �to command the troops in day‑to‑ day operations.�

The President's ultimate and plenary control over the military is underscored by his power to take actual command over troops in the field and to make tactical decisions ordinarily left to military generals, a power which several Presidents have seen fit to exercise. Indeed, some of the Framers and state ratification convention delegates proposed amendments that would have forbidden the President from taking actual command over the military.

However, those amendments were soundly defeated, indicating an understanding that the clause permitted the exercise of such a power. The President also has the authority to direct the movements of the armed forces, even to the extent of ordering them to deploy outside the United States in time of peace.

In view of this discussion of the Commander‑in‑Chief clause, it is apparent that the definition of �command� outlined in PDD‑25 is consistent in large part with the Commander‑in‑Chief clause.

The Commander‑in‑Chief clause contemplates a hierarchical command structure for the military with the President sitting at its apex, 60 as does PDD‑25.

Furthermore, the clause and PDD‑25 con-template that the President has the ultimate and undelegable (outside the military command structure) power to move troops, promote officers and enlisted personnel, enforce discipline, and alter the internal organization of military units. This view of �command� is consistent with the broad scope of power Presidents have claimed under the Commander‑in‑ Chief clause.

Although the Commander‑in‑Chief clause vests power over the military in the President, it can also be said that the clause also binds him by making him the person ultimately responsible for the exercise of that power and the consequences that flow therefrom.

In other words, the Commander‑in‑Chief clause serves not only as the source of Presidential authority, but also serves as a constraint on the President. PDD‑25 implicitly acknowledges the constraining effect of the Commander‑in‑Chief clause by its declarations that the President always has and never will relinquish command over the armed forces.

Given this revised construction of the Commander‑in‑ Chief clause as a constraint on as well as a grant of Presidential power, an examination of whether participa-tion by U.S. armed forces in military operations conducted the U.N. is permitted by our Constitution.

Article 43: Agreements and The Commander-In-Chief Clause: As part of the United Nations Charter, the founders of the United Nations provided a mechanism through which the organization could fulfill the wish of its founders to be the guarantor of world peace and stability.

Article 43 of the United Nations charter calls upon all members of the U.N., �in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,� to conclude special agreements with the U.N. Security Council to make "armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Popularly referred to as �Article 43 agreements,� the agreements were to specify the types and strength of forces that would be made available, their location and degree of readiness, and what facilities and assistance would accompany the troops.

Article 43 exhorts the charter's signatories to conclude these special agreements with the Security Council �as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council,� and additionally, it states that the special agreements would be "subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

The force arrangement contemplated by Article 43 was the result of a desire by the United States to establish a framework for collective security that could be enforced by use of military power to eliminate threats to world peace and stability, but also to limit the commitment of U.S. forces to such endeavors.

In particular, President Roosevelt opposed any arrangement that would bind the U.S. to provide forces for enforcement of collective security without its consent, any establishment of an international standing army, and any arrangement that did not permit the U.S. to restrict the number and type of armed forces that could be deployed outside the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the drafters seriously considered providing for a standing United Nations army, but they eventually scuttled the idea in favor of the framework outlined in Article 43.

The U.N. charter also established the Military Staff Committee (MSC) in Article 47. The MSC was to be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council or their nominees and any additional representatives the MSC deemed it necessary to associate.

The MSC's duties were to assist and advise the Security Council on the number of forces required to maintain international peace and security and to be responsible for the strategic direction of armed forces made available to the Security Council, presumably pursuant to Article 43 agreements. Article 47 also tersely provides that �[q]uestions relating to command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.�

In considering the constitutional implications of Article 43 during the debates on ratification of the United Nations Charter, the United States Senate concentrated almost exclusively on the potential effect Article 43 would have on Congressional war powers. In particular, some Senators vehemently argued that Article 43 was tantamount to a delegation of the congressional war powers to the Security Council or to the U.S. representative on the Council.

Other Senators stressed that the President should not be able to enter an Article 43 agreement without congressional approval of the agreement, or Congress would have in effect relinquished its power raise and support armies.

The Truman Administration assured Congress that the language in Article 43 that agreements to be concluded under it would be subject to ratification by the �constitutional processes� of member countries.

Despite the concerns of some of its members, the Senate overwhelmingly ratified the United Nations charter by a vote of 89‑2. Congress shortly thereafter passed the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA), which in part required the President to submit any proposed Article 43 agreement to Congress for its approval.

But once an Article 43 agreement was concluded, the President would not be required to seek congressional permission to make the agreed upon number of forces available to the Security Council upon its request.

The MSC convened its first meeting London in 1946 at the request of the Security Council to begin drafting a model Article 43 agreement. While all the members agreed that the Permanent Members of the Security Council would contribute most of the forces under Article 43 agreements and to reject establishing a U.N. army not subject to the control of the Security Council (or the veto of any of the five permanent members), the onset of the Cold War and the ensuing distrust that developed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union quickly disposed of the possibility of large commitments of forces from either country.

The MSC also failed to reach agreement on many other issues relating to Article 43 agreements, in particular the size of forces to be pledged, where the forces would be based when not under the control of the Security Council, responsibility for supplying pledged forces, etc.

By 1948, the MSC was hopelessly deadlocked and moribund. With the demise of the MSC, any hope of concluding Article 43 agreements quickly vanished, and Article 43 has remained largely dormant since that time.

The new restrictions on command and control of U.S. forces outlined in PDD‑25 illustrate not only would it contravene U.S. policy for the U.S. to comply with an Article 43 agreement, but it would most likely be unconstitutional as well. PDD‑25 emphasizes that the President must always retain command over U.S. forces.

However, the collective security scheme envisioned by Article 43 and Article 47 would require the President to cede command over U.S. forces pledged under an Article 43 agreement to the Security Council.

Once called by the Security Council for service in an enforcement action, forces pledged under an Article 43 agreement would come under the political and strategic control of the Security Council, which would then be responsible for the strategic and political decisions regarding the use of those forces.

The MSC would act not only in an advisory capacity to the Security Council, but would also act as a conduit through which the strategic and political decisions of the Security Council regarding the use of Article 43 forces would be implemented. Such an arrangement is clearly inconsistent with the position taken by the Clinton Administration in PDD‑25 since it would require the President to relinquish command over U.S. forces pledged under an Article 43 agreement to a command structure completely outside the U.S. chain of command. It is also inconsistent with the Constitution, implicitly contemplates a hierarchical command structure with the President at its top. Additionally, the U.S. most likely would not be able to recall troops placed at the disposal of the Security Council. While the U.S., as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, could always block passage of resolutions calling forth Article 43 forces by use of its veto,

Thus avoiding having to commit U.S. forces to the Security Council in the first place, once the Security Council passed a resolution calling Article 43 forces into service and command passed to the Security Council, the U.S. most likely would not be able unilaterally to withdraw its pledged forces without violating the Article 43 agreement, and accordingly, its treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter. Only a subsequent resolution by the Security Council, passage of which the U.S. could not assure, could return command of Article 43 forces back to their respective countries.

In contrast, PDD‑25 declares that �[t]he U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered.� PDD‑25 also specifies that when U.S. forces are placed under the �operational control� of a U.N. commander, the �fundamental elements of U.S. command still apply,� among which being the right of U.S. commanders to refer questionable orders to their U.S. superiors.

Thus, given the degree of control PDD‑25 would require the U.S. to retain over Article 43 forces, it seems clear not only that the U.S. not only comply with an Article 43 agreement, but also probably could not enter one either.

Furthermore, given that the Constitution vests command over U.S. armed forces in the President, it is difficult to see how the President could remain the Commander‑in‑ Chief of U.S. forces when they are placed under the command of the Security Council.

Thus, it appears not only that the United States will no longer support the revival of Article 43 for political reasons, it also appears that the U.S. probably should never seek to revive it because of the constitutional problems an Article 43 agreement with the Security Council would generate. Accordingly, Article 43 is likely to forever remain in the dustbin of bold visions never to be fulfilled.

�Command� vs. �Operational Control�: A Constitutionally Illusory Distinction: While PDD‑25 clearly prohibits placing of U.S. troops under the �command� of a U.N. commander,

PDD‑25 attempts to hedge this position by declaring that the U.S. may place its forces under the �operational control� of a U.N. commander when it finds that it is advantageous to U.S. interests to do so.

PDD‑25 describes operational control as a �subset of command� that entails the ability to �assign tasks� to U.S. forces that the President has already deployed, but operational control does not include certain other elements of command that are reserved to the President and are never vested in a U.N. commander.

The directive declares that this position is not a new one, and it cites instances from history in which U.S. troops, according to the directive, have served under the �operational control� of foreign commanders, the most notable being �World War I, World War II, Operations Desert Storm and. . .NATO from its inception.�

However, when examined more closely, the distinction PDD‑25 attempts to draw between �command� and �operational control� is arguably not a valid one when it is examined under the Commander‑in‑Chief clause. Accordingly, the President's authority to place U.S. troops under the �operational control� of a U.N. commander is, at the very least, constitutionally questionable.

Firstly, the directive's own concession that �operational control� is a �subset of command� deserves some attention. By defining operational control to be a �subset of command,� PDD‑25 implies that President is free to allow a U.N. commander to exercise such over U.S. forces without thereby relinquishing command.

Unfortunately, it is not clear that this conclusion follows. As discussed earlier, the Constitution vests plenary power to command the armed forces in the President by virtue of the Commander‑in‑Chief clause.

Moreover, the President as Commander‑in‑Chief has the power to take personal command of the armed forces. Of course, Presidents have rarely taken actual command (and for good reason), and most of the time actual command is delegated to the President's subordinates in the military chain of command. But although actual command and control is delegated to the President's subordinates, they ultimately remain responsible and accountable to the President for the exercise of this power.

However, it cannot be said that a U.N. commander is ultimately accountable to the President in the same way since a U.N. commander most likely has not taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and to follow the orders of the President, whereas U.S. military personnel are required to take such an oath. Just as the authority to command must flow from the President down through the chain of command,

Accountability must flow back up through the chain of command to the President. Under this view, operational control is not merely a �subset of command� but is an inseparable component of it which cannot be relinquished because of the break in the chain of accountability.

PDD‑25's attempt to provide accountability by specifying that U.S. forces must retain the right to refer questionable orders separately to their U.S. superiors is not entirely persuasive since although a U.S. commander may be held accountable to the President, his U.N. commander might not be.

Additionally, the Commander‑in‑Chief clause by its very language implies that all phases and aspects control over U.S. forces is vested in the President. A President who does not, through the chain of command, retain operational control over U.S. forces, "cannot be said to be 'in command'" of those forces.

Secondly, and more importantly, the historical precedents of "operational control" by foreign commanders fail to support the position PDD‑25 attempts to stake out. An examination of the proffered instances of foreign control over U.S. troops reveal that they fall into two categories: instances of actual command over U.S. forces by foreign generals in emergency situations, and instances where foreign control has been at most nominal and where the U.S. command structure has remained virtually intact.

U.S. troops served under the command of foreign generals in both World War I and World War II, contrary to PDD‑25's implication that they were merely under foreign operational control.

When the U.S. found itself dragged into World War I in 1917, it was ill‑equipped to deploy an army in Europe, primarily because it did not anticipate participation in the war. Until the U.S. could raise sufficient forces to deploy its own army in Europe,

President Wilson authorized U.S. troops to fight under the command of the Allies in Europe. Once in Europe, U.S. forces were integrated into British and French units and participated in several major battles under foreign command during 1917 and 1918. U.S. troops also fought under actual foreign command in World War II.

In 1942, the U.S. and Britain agreed to conduct �coalition operations:� the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff became a component of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), which organized field units composed of U.S. and British soldiers. Britain's General Montgomery commanded U.S. troops in Europe for a time, but by 1944 U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower had assumed command of all allied forces in Europe.

In each instance of foreign control over U.S. troops during the World Wars, U.S. forces were integrated into foreign units, and those forces reported directly to their respective foreign commanders.

However, had PDD‑25 been in effect during the World Wars, it would have flatly barred this level of control over U.S. troops. PDD‑25 expressly states that a foreign commander exercising operational control over U.S. forces may not �separate units� or �change their internal organization,� a principal which would have been violated by the integration of U.S. troops into foreign military units.

Also, U.S. troops were subsumed into command structures that were almost completely outside the U.S. chain of command, a situation PDD‑25 implicitly rejects as inconsistent with the U.S. policy of the President retaining command over U.S. forces at all times.

While placing U.S. troops under foreign command in these situations may have been constitutional exercises of the Commander‑in‑Chief power given the wartime exigencies involved, these examples simply do not lend much, if any, support to the command/operational control distinction.

U.S. forces have also served in traditional U.N. peacekeeping missions since the founding of the organization. Traditional peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of military and civilian personnel between formerly warring parties in order to monitor cease fires and provide a �zone of disengagement� between the parties.

Peacekeeping forces are ordinarily deployed only with the consent of all concerned parties; peacekeepers carry only light arms to be used only in self‑defense.

Peacekeeping forces are under the political control of the Security Council; however, the Secretary General is responsible for coordinating the day‑to‑day activities of peacekeeping forces.

The Secretary General delegates this authority to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, who is assisted by the Military Advisor. The Secretary General selects the force commander, subject to ratification by the Security Council, and the force commander reports to the Under Secretary.

As should be apparent, the command structure employed in traditional peacekeeping operations operates completely outside the U.S. military command structure, and the ultimate sources of command and control authority are the Secretary General and the Security Council. Placement of U.S. forces under the control of this command structure appears to be inconsistent with the hierarchical command structure contemplated by the Constitution.

Not only is there requirement that the force commander be a U.S. military officer, there is no guarantee that the peacekeeping force will be a U.S. military unit. Accordingly, this command and control arrangement does not appear to fall within the category of �operational control�as described in PDD‑25.

The fact that U.S. military personnel have served under traditional peacekeeping command structures in the past does not necessarily mean that the service was consistent with the Constitution.

Traditional peacekeepers are generally not in harms way. The recent controversy concerning command and control over U.S. forces participating in U.N. peace operations only arose when U.S. soldiers were placed in harms way and only erupted after U.S. soldiers were killed. Recent events have only now forced us to pay closer attention to a constitutional problem that has always been present.

PDD‑25 also cites Operation Desert Storm and NATO as examples where U.S. forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders.

However, an examination of both the proffered examples and similar situations reveal that in reality, these forces have actually operated under firm U.S. command and control. During the Korean War, President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur as commander of all United Nations forces in Korea, forces which eventually were comprised of contingents from sixteen nations.

Although lower levels of the command structure had multinational characteristics, the top level of the command structure "was essentially identical to what one would expect for a multilateral United States operation."

The U.S. exercised complete political and strategic control over U.N. forces. Foreign troops were integrated into U.S. units, and all foreign contingents fought under the command of the U.S. Eighth Army, which General MacArthur himself commanded.

During Operation Desert Storm, U.S. forces remained under the command of President George Bush and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), while Islamic forces operated under Saudi Arabian command. The initial agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia that allowed the U.S. to send its armed forces into Saudi Arabia specified that the Saudi Military was to provide the "strategic direction" for U.S. forces.

However, the term was never defined, and CENTCOM eventually interpreted the term as allowing �general guidance at a strategic level with no actual command authority.� The U.S. specifically sought to avoid any foreign or U.N. control over U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf.

Finally, U.S. troops in stationed in Western Europe are only under the nominal command of NATO, as the top general in NATO �has always been a double‑hatted U.S. commander.�

Conclusion: PDD‑25 is an attempt by the Clinton Administration to fashion a compromise between its desire to have the U.N. play more of role in maintaining international peace and stability, and the demands of our form of government and the American people that the U.S. retain control over the U.S. forces that are required for the U.N. to be able to fulfill this role. Despite the austerity of the new position with regard to command and control of U.S. forces participating in U.N. operations set forth in Section V, some commentators have criticized PDD‑25 as not going far enough, and legislation has been introduced in both houses of Congress that would impose restrictions on the President's ability to place U.S. forces at the disposal of the U.N. well beyond those imposed by PDD‑25.

Nevertheless, PDD‑25 and the legislation currently before Congress implicitly recognize that the Commander‑in‑Chief clause acts not only as a grant of power to the President, but also acts as a constraint on the power the President may exercise with regard to U.S. armed forces. The Commander‑in‑Chief clause is indeed a �forgotten constraint� that has only now been discovered and averred to when the demand for a constraint has arisen. Future participation by the U.S. in U.N. operations will invariably be weighed against this newly‑ found constraint, and as this paper has argued, �Commander‑in‑ Chief clause analysis� not always likely to yield a conclusion of constitutionality, especially where the U.S. proposes to have the U.N. exercise control over U.S. armed forces. PDD‑25 fails to do an adequate job of addressing this constraint, and accordingly, its proposed solution to the problem is not entirely convincing.

An Internal Security Emergency Detention Order: As Provided Under the McCarran Act.

The President of the United States has declared that an �Internal Security Emergency� This Federal Bureau of Investigation is hereby authorized by the Attorney General of the United States �to apprehend and detain the person named, designated and described below...as to whom there is reasonable grounds to believe that he/she probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage.�

The detention will be in the place designated below by the office of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice and as is authorized by the Attorney General of the United States.

The detention of the below-designated person will last until the end of the Internal Security Emergency is proclaimed by the President of the United States or by a Concurrent Resolution of both Houses of the United States Congress, or until a release may be effected by either the Attorney General of the United States or by the Board of Detention Review.

Protection For Informants? The Department of Justice �at no time is required to release any information the revelation of which would disclose the identity or evidence of Government agents or officers which it believes would be dangerous to the national safety and security to divulge.�

To knowingly disregard or evade apprehension of this dentine warrant is a federal crime punishable by a fine of $10,000 and imprisonment or 10 years, or both.

A copy of this Federal Detention Order shall be supplied the person designated for apprehension and detention. Signed by the Attorney General of the United States.

All this sort of thing has happened to the South during and after the Civil War, when the Southerners land, homes, property and lives were taken by the Union Soldiers; It will happen in America again!!! The Government must protect itself from �We - The People!�

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